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Resources could satisfy the adequacy constraint, provided that both this 
theory and the relevant constraint are properly understood. 
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Introduction 
 
This article takes as its starting point the normative principle that every individual on 
the planet has a claim to an equally valuable share of Earth’s natural resources (e.g., 
Barry 1982, p. 235). Call this the Principle of Natural Resource Equality. Plainly a 
comprehensive theorisation of this principle would contain accounts of the following: 
how it can be justified (such as by indicating from which more basic or fundamental 
moral principle(s) it follows); what regulatory principles best serve it (such as 
principles mandating the imposition of global taxes on the possession, extraction, 
trade, or consumption of natural resources, principles demanding the honouring of 
local property rights, or even principles calling for the free movement of people 
across borders should they lack access to natural resources in the countries of their 
birth); its relationship or interaction with other important principles of justice (such as 
principles of intergenerational and environmental justice). 
 However, I do not intend to focus on these issues here, except for making some 
limited observations along the way. Instead, I wish to address the following problem 
faced by all adherents of the Principle of Natural Resource Equality. Unless and until 
they are able to specify a tool or mechanism for determining the comparative value of 
two or more bundles of natural resources the principle lacks meaning. This could 
make it harder to persuade people of its truth. The absence of a valuation-mechanism 
might also produce indeterminate speculation about what it demands in practice. 
Claims about justice or injustice made on its behalf could appear baseless or arbitrary 
and, as a result, states may be less inclined to take it seriously even if they accepted its 
truth (cf. Miller 2007, p. 61). But in searching for meaning adherents of the Principle 
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of Natural Resource Equality must attend to this prior question: what would constitute 
an adequate valuation-mechanism? At this point they face a dilemma. On the one 
hand, if the answer they give to this question is predicated upon weak adequacy 
constraints, they risk the possibility that several valuation-mechanisms satisfy the 
constraints, and so the selection of any given valuation-mechanism would be 
underdetermined. On the other hand, if in answer to this question defenders of the 
Principle of Natural Resource Equality propose adequacy constraints which are too 
stringent, there is a danger that no valuation-mechanism could satisfy those 
constraints. They will have shown that an adequate way of comparing the value of 
two or more bundles of natural resources does not exist. Call this the Problem of 
Valuation. 
 The main purpose of the article is to put forward three adequacy constraints qua 
solution to the Problem of Valuation. I shall then examine whether or not these 
constraints can be satisfied by a Dworkinean theorisation of the Principle of Natural 
Resource Equality that I have already expounded elsewhere, namely, Global Equality 
of Resources (Brown 2009, ch. 7). In doing so I also hope to respond to certain 
criticisms that either have been or could be laid at the door of Global Equality of 
Resources. I begin by presenting three possible adequacy constraints on a conception 
of the Principle of Natural Resource Equality. I also seek to show why these 
constraints are non-trivial. I then give a very brief overview of Global Equality of 
Resources. Following on from that, I test Global Equality of Resources against the 
three adequacy constraints respectively. In each case I try to argue that Global 
Equality of Resources could satisfy the constraint, provided that both the theory and 
the relevant constraint are properly understood − something that critics of the 
Principle of Natural Resource Equality and Global Equality of Resources alike have 
not always taken sufficient care in doing. Finally, I offer some very brief comments 
on the relative difficulty of satisfying the three adequacy constraints at the global and 
domestic levels, and enumerate several possible ways of justifying the Principle of 
Natural Resource Equality. 
 Before presenting my three adequacy constraints, however, I want to briefly 
address the issue of regulatory principles. I believe that adherents of the Principle of 
Natural Resource Equality should be open − or should be ready to endorse in the 
absence of superior alternatives − the Principle of Value Equality, according to which 
every individual on the planet is entitled to an equal share of the monetary value of 
Earth’s natural resources. The difference between the Principle of Natural Resource 
Equality and the Principle of Value Equality is not merely semantic or hair splitting. It 
is the difference between an abstract principle which sets out a general vision of what 
global justice requires and a regulatory principle the purpose of which is to lend 
substance to, or provide a practical framework for realising, the abstract principle. 
Among some of its proponents, most notably Hillel Steiner, the idea that every 
individual is entitled to an equal share of the monetary value of Earth’s natural 
resources is sometimes presented as a ‘rent’ to be paid by those who currently possess 
or benefit from an unequally large share of the value of Earth’s natural resources 
(Steiner 1994, ch. 8; 1998, pp. 99-100n.12; 1999, p. 175; 2005, p. 37n.6). I see this as 
a regulatory principle that might plausibly be viewed as a substantive interpretation 
of, or put in the service of, the Principle of Natural Resource Equality.1 But I shall not 
attempt here to present reasons for preferring the Principle of Value Equality to 
alternative regulatory principles vis-à-vis the Principle of Natural Resource Equality. 
 At this preliminary stage I also need to mention an objection to the use of markets 
in the theory of natural resource equality which speaks not to problems of 
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measurement as such but to equal claims. The objection stems from (a) the fact that 
the market value of natural resources will tend to reflect facts about their production 
and consumption and (b) the fact that different human beings will tend to contribute to 
the market value of natural resources to differing degrees in virtue of contributing to 
production and consumption to differing degrees (see Steiner 2005; 2011; Miller 
2011). Whilst it is true that virtually all naturally-occurring entities or raw materials 
have some market value even if no factors of production (e.g., labour, capital) have 
been invested in them, it is also true that their full market value will reflect many 
different kinds of facts other than facts about the natural objects or raw materials 
themselves.2 Facts about technological practices, for instance, can influence market 
values in at least two ways. First, actualising the latent potential of Earth’s naturally-
occurring objects or raw materials means first doing something to or with them (cf. 
Miller 1999a, p. 234; Hayward 2006). In other words, material resources (e.g., usable 
oils, gasses, rocks, metals, metalloids, wood, arable land, edible plants and fruits, 
meat, and drinking water) must be created from natural resources (e.g., extracting, 
purifying, refining, collecting, chopping, ploughing, growing, husbanding, and 
cooking). Hence the market prices of natural resources will reflect levels of 
technological know-how. Second, the market prices of natural resources will also 
depend on the market prices of material resources created from them, and these prices 
will themselves reflect the extent of technologies which employ or require material 
resources. Together this means that the value of silicon, say, reflects not only the 
existence and prevalence of technologies which can be used in its extraction and 
purification but also the technologies and technological practices in which it is 
employed as an input (once it has been very highly purified), such as the manufacture 
and usage of computer chips, photovoltaic panels, televisions, digital cameras, and 
cell phones. But not everyone contributes equally to the development of the 
technologies used in the extraction and purification of silicon, and not everyone 
makes the same usage of the technologies in which silicon is employed. The current 
objection to the use of market prices in the theory of natural resource equality, 
therefore, is that doing so could potentially introduce into the picture special claims to 
unequal shares (of monetary value). 
 I shall not seek to answer the aforesaid objection here save for making two 
limited points. The first is that there is more than one way for individuals to make a 
contribution to technological practices (broadly construed). So even if certain groups 
of people do not contribute to the high value of particular types of natural resources 
via the production of technologies used in their production or purification, or even via 
the consumption of the technologies in which they are employed, it is quite possible 
that they indirectly contribute to the high value of those particular types of natural 
resources by consuming products the manufacture of which is facilitated by the 
technologies in which those resources are ultimately employed. The second is that it 
may be possible to look upon people who are unable to participate in the production 
and consumption of technologies, directly or indirectly, as partly the victims of bad 
brute luck. Thus, in my Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Equality I also included a range 
of insurance markets in which people had adequate opportunity to purchase different 
types and levels of insurance against various types of risks on Mini-Earth ex ante, 
where those risked were stipulated to be equal for all individuals. This included a 
hypothetical insurance market in which people are assumed to face an equal risk of 
lacking the necessary ‘development talent’ to contribute to technological practices 
relating to the production and consumption of material resources to differing degrees 
(Brown 2009, pp. 194-5).3 
 4 
 
 
Three adequacy constraints 
 
How should we judge the adequacy of a conception of the Principle of Natural 
Resource Equality such as Global Equality of Resources? The following three 
adequacy constraints have emerged in the literature. The first makes it a condition that 
any proposed valuation-mechanism must not be reliant upon or assume the existence 
of some prior distribution or anticipated distribution of natural resources which is 
itself arbitrary (cf. Miller 2011, p. 101; Mack 2009, p. 116). The rationale behind this 
adequacy constraint is that we expect the valuation-mechanism to rise to the challenge 
of providing a non-arbitrary way of comparing the value of two or more bundles of 
natural resources and we could not regard that expectation as having been satisfied if 
it turned out that the valuation-mechanism was itself reliant upon an arbitrary 
distribution of natural resources. 
 According to the second adequacy constraint, any valuation-mechanism used to 
flesh out the Principle of Natural Resource Equality must be one that ‘everybody 
could reasonably accept’ (Risse 2012, pp. 122-3). This is, of course, a highly abstract 
idea − one which can be interpreted in various different ways.4 Thus, in what follows 
I shall assume that it means, at least, the following.5 A valuation-mechanism would 
not be adequate if some of the people who have a claim to equally valuable shares of 
natural resources cannot reasonably accept it because they legitimately feel alienated 
by it. The basic rationale for this constraint is that everyone has not merely a claim to 
an equally valuable bundle of natural resources but also a reasonable expectation that 
the valuation-mechanism chosen for determining their equally valuable bundle is one 
that resonates with them or does not seem foreign to them or from which they are not 
estranged. I shall say more about this below. This constraint is important partly 
because the stakes are high and partly because each person is presumptively capable 
of autonomous thought about the appropriate valuation-mechanism. 
 The third adequacy constraint says that a tool or mechanism for the valuation of 
two or more bundles of natural resources is inadequate if it involves unfair 
discrimination against an individual (or individuals). This unfairness typically takes 
the form of the imposition or assumption of a particular norm, rule, or practice that 
figures in the valuation-mechanism and that imposes, directly or indirectly, some 
genuine resource-based cost or deficit on an individual (or individuals) but not on 
others in virtue of some integral feature of people’s race, ethnicity, gender, age, 
religious belief, language, or even cultural identity.6 I take it as read that this constraint 
applies both to actual individuals confronted with a conception of the Principle of 
Natural Resource Equality and to any hypothetical individuals the existence of which 
is assumed as part of the specification of such a conception. The force of this 
adequacy constraint is that without it a valuation-mechanism could strike people as 
not enabling distributive justice but perpetrating distributive injustice.  
 To clarify, I do not mean to imply that these three adequacy constraints could 
capture, let alone exhaust, the set of generic constraints on any theory of global 
distributive justice. Instead, I present them as speaking directly to the specification of 
the Principle of Natural Resource Equality in particular, and at the same time as 
flowing from species of objections that either have been or could be laid at the door of 
Global Equality of Resources specifically. 
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Global equality of resources 
 
In chapter 7 of my Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Equality I remodelled Dworkin’s 
theory of equality of resources (Dworkin 1981b; 2000) as a theory of global 
distributive justice under the heading Global Equality of Resources (Brown 2009, ch. 
7).7 I imagined that at some time in the near future the people of Earth are forced to 
abandon their planet after an unforeseen and unprovoked alien onslaught. After 
travelling aimlessly in space for a period time the survivors (a small number from 
each nation) find themselves space-shipwrecked on a small planet (Mini-Earth) which 
has abundant natural resources (p. 171). After making various other assumptions (pp. 
172-3), I imagined that the new inhabitants of Mini-Earth elect a divider who 
institutes an auction of bundles of natural resources, with Mini-Earth clamshells used 
as bidding counters. Reflecting on the international dimension of the remodelled 
thought experiment I also examined the question of whether the auctioneer should 
hand out clamshells to individuals or to representatives of nations. In the book I came 
down on the side of allocating clamshells to individuals for reasons of satisfying the 
original envy test and ethical individualism (pp. 174-6).  
 In this article I want to investigate more deeply the implications of the 
aforementioned Problem of Valuation for Global Equality of Resources. 
 
 
First adequacy constraint: avoiding arbitrariness 
 
According to the first adequacy constraint, a valuation-mechanism cannot be reliant 
upon or assume some prior distribution or anticipated distribution of natural resources 
which is itself arbitrary. Some people have argued that any specification of the 
Principle of Natural Resource Equality and the Principle of Value Equality that 
appeals to market prices cannot satisfy this requirement. This line of scepticism might 
apply to Global Equality of Resources as follows. The Mini-Earth auction creates 
valuations which partly reflect the importance that bidders place on particular bundles 
of natural resources as potentially useful means of achieving their desired ends and 
the extent to which resources are in limited supply. However, it is also the case that 
desired ends and buying decisions are not fixed but instead respond to actual or 
anticipated bundles of natural resources. But if auction prices are partly determined by 
the various desires and buying decisions that people develop in response to actual or 
anticipated bundles of natural resources, then there exists no independent set of prices 
(i.e., independent of some prior distribution or anticipated distribution of natural 
resources) which could be used to determine equally valuable bundles of natural 
resources. In other words, auction prices are supposed to tell us how to distribute 
natural resources non-arbitrarily but at the same time they assume some prior 
distribution or anticipated distribution of natural resources which itself may seem 
arbitrary, and so we are back to square one. The apparent arbitrariness stems from the 
fact that for any bundle of natural resources someone ends up with he or she could 
complain that its constituent elements could have been different under an alternative 
initial distribution or anticipated distribution of natural resources and its concomitant 
pattern of desires and buying decisions.8 
 Ironically, this objection to using auction prices to determine the value of bundles 
of natural resources also bears certain similarities with one of Dworkin’s main 
objections to equality of welfare. Consider relative success theories of welfare, where 
relative success is defined by how successful an individual has been in fulfilling his or 
 6 
her preferences, goals and ambitions. Dworkin points out that individuals ‘make their 
choices, about what sort of life to lead, against a background of assumptions about the 
rough type and quantity of resources they will have available with which to lead 
different sorts of life’ (Dworkin 1981a, p. 205). Given this fact, the problem is to 
explain how equality of relative success could be measured without drawing on some 
independent conception of fair shares. How would we know what resources to 
transfer to each person such that everybody enjoys equality of welfare if the 
composition and extent of relative success at any given time reflects facts about the 
distribution of the very resources that we want to know how to distribute? There is, as 
Dworkin puts it, ‘danger of a fatal circle here’ (p. 205). 
 However, it is important to remember that the present adequacy constraint does 
not say that a tool or mechanism for the valuation of two or more bundles of natural 
resources may not be reliant upon some prior distribution or anticipated distribution of 
natural resources. Rather, it says, in effect, that if the valuation-mechanism is reliant 
upon some prior distribution or anticipated distribution of natural resources, the latter 
must not be arbitrary. So the question is whether the distributions or anticipated 
distributions that influence the desire ends and buying decisions which partly 
determine auction prices are themselves arbitrary.  
 I suggest that these prior distributions or anticipated distributions need not be 
arbitrary. There are two forms of non-arbitrariness I will mention. The first has to do 
with the actions of the divider. In both Dworkin’s original thought experiment and my 
Mini-Earth version the divider does not act on random choice or personal whim. He is 
tasked with finding a process that can produce a distribution that will satisfy the envy 
test, and he reasons that an auction is a rational means of pursuing that end. He acts in 
a systematic way by trying to identity natural objects that people would recognise and 
want to bid for as separate lots and by dividing quantities of raw materials into 
roughly the same number of lots as there are people. The auctioneer also hands out 
equal numbers of Mini-Earth clamshells to everyone without prejudice or favouritism. 
The auction is conducted and it produces what is a first approximation of what equally 
valuable bundles of natural resources might look like. Clearly this is not a perfect 
realisation of equality, but that does not make it arbitrary therefore. The term 
‘arbitrary’ might suggest, on one reading, a set of valuations that are determined by 
the whim of one person. But that is not the case here. Quite the opposite in fact. It is 
true that the auctioneer creates the original lots, but he or she exercises no partial 
discretion over what those lots should be. Instead, he or she responds to requests for 
different lots wherever feasible. He endeavours to ensure that in each equally valuable 
bundle persons end up with − to steal a phrase from Steiner − ‘more of what they 
value more and less of what they value less’ (Steiner 2011, pp. 121-2). The point is 
that the auction is an iterative process, which, to borrow from Dworkin’s description 
of the original thought experiment, means that ‘each of the immigrants remains free to 
change his bids even when an initially market-clearing set of prices is reached, or 
even to propose different lots’ (Dworkin 1981b, p. 287). Thus, ‘[t]he auction is run 
again and again until nobody prefers anyone else’s bundle and the survivors come to 
understand and accept that they cannot do better by further iterations of the auction’ 
(p. 287n.3).  
 Second, it might be argued that arbitrariness, on another reading, is a set of 
valuations that are determined by any factor for which people are not presumptively 
responsible. But it seems to me that the charge of arbitrariness, in this other sense, of 
the valuations which occur during the iterated auction process can be countered by 
further reflection on the attitudes or dispositions that bidders may have toward the 
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aforementioned prior distributions or anticipated distributions. These distributions do 
not merely influence desires and buying decisions but are themselves influenced by 
the desires and buying decisions that emerge in earlier iterations and these desires and 
buying decisions need not be arbitrary, I think. Specifically, there may be a morally 
relevant difference between desires and buying decisions that a person develops in 
response to his or her good faith estimates of what an equally valuable bundle of 
natural resources is likely to be once the process has been completed, on the one hand, 
and desires and buying decisions that a person develops when motivated by a flagrant 
disregard for such estimates, on the other hand. In the former case a person is 
disposed to develop desires and buying decisions based on the cumulative evidence 
created by each iteration of the auction concerning what equally valuable shares are 
likely to be. This does not mean that he or she only desires what is affordable. It is 
perfectly acceptable for desires to sit above and below reasonable expectations. But it 
does mean that in the former case desires and buying decisions (such as they are) 
supervene upon good faith estimates of just end results. Perhaps the estimates will be 
less accurate at the start of the process than at the end, but based on what happens 
during the iterations the estimates may become more fine-tuned as the process 
unfolds. Surely if it is the case that by and large people’s desires and buying decisions 
are based on good faith estimates of just end results, this would lend further credence 
to the claim that the prior distributions and anticipated distributions which influence 
the end results are not arbitrary, in the sense that the valuations reflect factors for 
which people are presumptively responsible. This might be a circle, but it need not be 
a fatal circle.  
 Of course, my argument here relies on contingent facts about what actually 
motivates people, namely, good faith estimates as opposed to a flagrant disregard for 
such estimates. But the operative assumption need not be viewed with suspicion, 
especially when viewed in the context of ideal theory. It speaks to a type of ideal 
theory in which it is assumed for the purposes of developing a coherent conception of 
the Principle of Natural Resource Equality that people are already committed to that 
principle, abstract as it may be, and are motivated as far as possible to act in ways 
which aid its realisation.  
 I also believe that this assumption, or something like it, underpins Dworkin’s 
rejection of the suggestion that ‘bad price luck’ − ‘bad luck in the high cost of the 
preferences [people] have’ − is a source of valid claims for redistribution (Dworkin 
2004, p. 344). Persons can only suffer bad price luck if they have a set of preferences 
they cannot afford to satisfy, but they develop their preferences based on what 
resources they have and information about what resources they will need in order to 
satisfy possible preferences. If bad price luck were a source of valid claims for 
redistribution, then no sooner have everyone’s claims been met than people will 
develop new preferences which in turn will change prices thus generating more bad 
price luck and further claims (p. 344). For Dworkin, one might say, it is a working 
assumption within the theory of equality of resources that people are presumptively 
responsible for deciding for themselves what sorts of lives to pursue including 
cultivating preferences against a background of information about the social value of 
the resources they need in order to live different kinds of lives including the 
satisfaction of various preferences, and against a background of information about 
what equal shares might turn out to be (pp. 344-50; cf. Dworkin 1981b, p. 205). 
 
 
Second adequacy constraint: avoiding alienation 
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According to the second adequacy constraint − under my proposed interpretation − a 
mechanism for the valuation of two or more bundles of natural resources would not be 
adequate if some of the people who have a claim to equally valuable shares of natural 
resources cannot reasonably accept it because they legitimately feel alienated by it. 
Interestingly, Risse alleges that Dworkin’s device ‘does not provide what defenders of 
Equal Division need’ (Risse 2012, p. 123), namely, ‘a uniquely most plausible way of 
assessing the value in question, one that everybody could reasonably accept’ (pp. 122-
3). What is more, Risse claims that my own proposal for how to adjust Dworkin’s 
device for the global sphere ‘does not solve the problem we are discussing now’ (p. 
382n.23). But what reason might there be to think that participants in my Mini-Earth 
version of Dworkin’s auction cannot reasonably accept the auction mechanism? More 
specifically, what reason might there be to think that participants could legitimately 
feel alienated by it? 
 Consider once again the example of silicon valuation. Suppose Mini-Earth’s large 
silicon deposits command a relatively high value in the auction because it is 
anticipated that most inhabitants are minded to possess and partake in the various 
technologies and technological practices associated with both the purification and the 
use of silicon. But suppose that a group of inhabitants, call them the Luddites, are 
committed to neither possessing nor partaking in these technologies and technological 
practices. Could they legitimately feel alienated by and, therefore, reasonably not 
accept the auction mechanism because when applied to silicon its output valuation 
reflects the existence of social contexts or practices which they reject? 
 I believe not. Now I do not deny that Luddites could feel alienated by modern 
technology and the particular ways of life it promotes or to which it especially lends 
itself. And that this alienation could lead them to also feel alienated by a valuation-
mechanism that placed a relatively high value on the natural resources exploited by 
and employed in the creation of modern technology. But it does not follow from this 
that the sense of alienation is legitimate or could be grounds to reasonably not accept 
the valuation-mechanism itself. Faced with people who felt alienated by the auction 
mechanism because of the way silicon, say, ended up being valued − that is, because 
of their rejection of social contexts and practices associated with the purification and 
use of silicon − the auctioneer could point out that the auction mechanism also places 
a relatively high value (let us assume it does) on Mini-Earth’s small deposits of the 
special varieties of stone, wood, and reed that are commonly used in traditional arts 
and crafts − social contexts and practices that are to the Luddites’ liking. One might 
go so far as to say that the Luddites can − or should − accept the mechanism because 
of the way special varieties of stone, wood, and reed end up being valued − that is, 
because of their acceptance of social contexts and practices associated with the 
harvesting and utilisation of special varieties of stone, wood, and reed. In light of 
these facts the Luddites’ feeling of alienation toward the auction mechanism might 
seem misplaced and not legitimate. In other words, they cannot legitimately expect to 
feel an affinity with all of the social contexts and practices upon which the valuations 
of the very different natural resources depend, not least because of the plurality of 
conceptions of the good life found on Mini-Earth. So long as their sense of 
estrangement is limited, there is no grounds for their reasonable non-acceptance. 
Perhaps in one sense this observation amounts to an affirmation of the auction 
mechanism as a legitimate way of adjudicating between not merely competing claims 
to the use of natural resources but also competing claims to social contexts and 
practices (cf. Dworkin 1981b, p. 338). 
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Third adequacy constraint: avoiding unfair discrimination 
 
The third adequacy constraint says that a tool or mechanism for the valuation of two 
or more bundles of natural resources is inadequate if it involves unfair discrimination 
against an individual (or individuals). According to Avery Kolers (2012), one 
potential form of unfair discrimination emerges if one considers the plight of people 
who, for reasons of maintaining their cultural traditions, wish to use certain natural 
resources for uses other than their most profitable uses. He writes as follows. 
 
For example, suppose it is 1930 when a Dworkinian resource auction 
transpires. The Bedouin population of Arabia is not interested in oil. The 
Bedouins have a lifestyle adapted to low population density and geographic 
mobility in the Arabian Desert. If they are to prevent the land being 
purchased by oil entrepreneurs with the backing of millions of people in 
industrialized societies, they will have to outbid all those people; having done 
so they will have to find a way to meet all the other needs that they no longer 
have the resources to meet in their preferred ways. They can do so either by 
becoming oil workers themselves, or by inviting in foreign oil workers and 
taking a cut of the proceeds in order to pay the tax on the resource bundle. If 
they cannot or choose not to outbid the industrialized horde, they will end up 
out of Arabia – or, if in Arabia, they will lose their geographic mobility and 
have to find something else to do. Perhaps they can become oil workers. 
What the Bedouins need here, if they are to keep their (by no means opulent) 
way of life when challenged by a theory of just distribution of resources, is 
the capacity to deny that the oil under their feet is a resource. Dworkin’s 
auction might treat all persons equally given a shared ontology of the material 
world, but it does not treat all persons equally given differences in the 
prevalence of such ontologies. (Kolers 2012, p. 276) 
 
Now it is not at all clear to me how ‘oil entrepreneurs with the backing of millions of 
people in industrialized societies’ can be thought to exist within the narrow terms of 
Dworkin’s hypothetical desert-island auction; let alone my Mini-Earth auction. But let 
us just suppose that the Bedouins are bidding against a group of survivors who believe 
they have found an ingenious way to achieve large-scale oil extraction with only their 
per capita equal share of clamshells. What should we make of Kolers’ objection? 
 It strikes me as both perverse and culturally patronising to suggest that the 
Bedouins ought to be given an opportunity to ‘deny that the oil under their feet is a 
resource’. After all, Bedouins are likely to want to purchase this resource in post-
auction markets for everyday use in oil lamps. Surely what they need instead is the 
opportunity to bid for suitable desert land, which has oil underneath it, without being 
obliged to bid under a liberal liberty/constraint system that permits oil entrepreneurs 
to probe, extract, and spoil the land without regard to what this does to market prices 
and the Bedouin way of life. It is worth stressing that what is potentially unfair here is 
the fact that individual Bedouins are being forced to pay a price that reflects a non-
neutral liberty/constraint system. There is perhaps more than one solution here,9 but I 
would propose that the auctioneer creates separate lots, some with desert land 
attached to liberal ownership rights and some with desert land bound together with 
more restrictive ownership rights, including rules against gratuitous oil exploration, of 
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a sort that Bedouins and perhaps environmentalists might wish to bid for (Brown 
2009, pp. 179-80, 215-6n.2). This means that at least when the Bedouins decide to bid 
for desert land bound together with more restrictive ownership rights they will not 
face competition from oil entrepreneurs of the sort which would otherwise make the 
land very expensive. Indeed, when prices reach their equilibrium it may be the case 
that some Bedouins would wish to bid for at least some of the liberal lots (so that they 
have the option to sell the land to interested parties in the future, or perhaps even the 
option to change their own way of life in the future, should they so desire).  
  I now wish to address possible grounds for complaint that I believe do not reach 
the level of unfair discrimination. I have in mind people who possess culturally-based 
preferences for, or interests in, the adoption of non-market mechanisms for the 
valuation of some or all of the available natural resources. In cases of partial rejection 
people do not reject the proposed valuation-mechanism outright but they cannot 
accept the application of the valuation-mechanism to all natural resources because 
they would prefer it if, or have an interest in its being the case that, at least some 
resources are valued in other ways. Imagine that among the people space-shipwrecked 
on Mini-Earth are members of highly traditional and ritualised societies for whom it is 
conventional to regard the value of certain natural objects as given by the practices of 
gift-giving and funeral rites. They should like to look upon at least some of the natural 
objects found on Mini-Earth as bearing value only as gifts or as sacrifices to the spirits 
of their ancestors and not as things which command prices within an auction.10 In 
cases of full rejection certain people cannot countenance a proposed valuation-
mechanism as the specification of the Principle of Natural Resource Equality for any 
natural resources. Suppose that some of the inhabitants of Mini-Earth develop a new 
theology in response to their circumstances. They waste no time in recognising the 
fact that virtually all of the natural objects found on Mini-Earth bear a striking 
resemblance to those found on Earth. They feel compelled by these discoveries to 
accept this as conclusive evidence of a kind of cosmic intelligent design. And they 
adopt a new way of seeing value in the objects they see around them, namely, as the 
products of the infinite capacity for creativity of their God. While they treat all natural 
resources on Mini-Earth as blessed, they perceive that some objects are more intricate, 
complex, beautiful, and sublime than others. They further reason that by endowing 
them with the capacity to sense or intuit degrees of quality in natural objects God 
wanted to disclose to them His divine system of valuation. So they make it their 
mission to interpret in what they see around them the signs of what God would have 
them revere to greater or lesser extents and based on this they swiftly draw up their 
own assessments of the comparative sacred value of different bundles of natural 
resources. As such, they denounce the auction and its concept of price as the mere 
projection of secular, anthropocentric and humanistic values onto the world.  
 My position is that partial or full rejection of the auction mechanism by the 
traditionalists and the religionists on the aforesaid grounds does not rise to the level of 
a complaint of unfair discrimination. I offer two reasons for this position. The first is 
that neither the traditionalists nor the religionists are themselves claiming − nor is it 
necessarily true − that the auction has left them with less of what they value more and 
more of what they value less than some alternative method they favour. Even though 
ordinary non-traditionalists and non-religionists are not totally oblivious to the fact 
that the traditionalists and the religionists might prefer a different valuation-
mechanism, other things remaining equal the former have no particular reason to bid 
for the natural objects most revered or held most sacred by the latter, and so the prices 
of the auction lots containing those objects are not artificially inflated. And there is no 
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unfair discrimination on that score. Indeed, there is a sense in which the auction 
valuation of natural resources at equilibrium itself reflects the different preferences 
and interests concerning the best ways to value natural resources that individuals 
bring to the auction. In other words, the traditionalist and religionists are not being 
denied the right to pursue their alternative schemes of valuation through the auction 
mechanism itself. The traditionalists can bid for certain types of natural resources 
which would be suitable for their socio-cultural practices, so that their bidding 
decisions reflect the ways they value or would like to value those resources. And the 
religionists can choose to bid for certain natural resources in accordance with their 
own scheme of valuation as their consciences dictate. So adopting the auction is a 
way of indirectly accommodating a range of different ways of valuing natural 
resources by converting the diversity of possible schemes of valuation into a single 
mechanism qua overarching touchstone. Underpinning this mechanism is a respect for 
people’s freedom to bid for lots on the basis of their own schemes of valuation. 
 Of course, at this point the traditionalists and the religionists could insist that even 
if the auction mechanism indirectly accommodates their preferences and interests, it 
remains the case that it is the auction mechanism rather than their preferred 
mechanisms which is used for valuing resources. They may not care frankly that only 
the auction has the ability to accommodate different schemes of valuation. However, 
my second reason for adopting the aforementioned position is that the preferences or 
interests that support these kinds of deep-level objections go beyond the narrow 
project of finding an adequate conception of the Principle of Natural Resource 
Equality. The traditionalists and the religionists are effectively refusing to accept the 
mechanism because it sits uneasily with their cultural beliefs, commitments, or ways 
of life such that employing it imposes unwanted burdens upon them. These burdens 
might include: unsatisfied preferences concerning the operative valuation-mechanism; 
certain feelings of unease or regret that an individual might experience as a 
consequence of the failure to satisfy these preferences; the fact of living with a 
sacrilegious valuation-mechanism; the burden of having to reverse the 
commodification of certain natural objects buy bidding for them in the auction and 
then keeping them off the market (as objects that are suitable for socio-cultural 
practices and the true value of which has nothing to do with market price). Earlier I 
defined unfair discrimination in terms of the idea of resource-based costs or deficits. 
And whatever else one might want to say about the aforementioned unwanted burdens 
it is clear that they do not fall easily into the category resources, even if they do fall 
into the categories welfare or capabilities. And so there is no unfair discrimination on 
this score either. Putting the point another way, my primary interest in this article is 
not welfare-based or even capability-based egalitarian objections to resource 
egalitarianism: i.e., reasons of the form, “I agree that justice demands equality of 
something, but I cannot agree that this ought to be equality of resources.” Instead, my 
interest is with the narrower question of whether it is possible to develop an adequate 
conception of the Principle of Natural Resource Equality: i.e., reasons of the form, “I 
intuitively believe in the Principle of Natural Resource Equality, but I am not yet 
convinced that any of the leading conceptions of that idea are adequate.” 
 In summary, I have suggested that the Problem of Valuation calls for the 
avoidance of two extremes: first, embracing adequacy constraints on a conception of 
the Principle of Natural Resource Equality that are too weak, trivial or simple to 
overcome such that a decision to use one valuation-mechanism rather than another 
will be underdetermined; second, embracing adequacy constraints that are too strong, 
demanding or difficult to overcome such that it is impossible to specify the principle 
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in terms of any adequate valuation-mechanism. I have tried to avoid these two 
extremes by adopting three adequacy constraints on a conception of the Principle of 
Natural Resource Equality − that have to do with the avoidance of arbitrariness, 
alienation, and unfair discrimination respectively. Moreover, I have sought to show 
that Global Equality of Resources has the wherewithal to satisfy each of these 
constraints provided that it as well as the constraints are properly understood. 
 
 
Justifying the Principle of Natural Resource Equality 
 
Thus far I have assumed rather than justified the Principle of Natural Resource 
Equality. So in this section I will offer some possible justifications for it. But before 
doing so, I want to briefly address the question of whether or not the three adequacy 
constraints discussed above are only relevant to resource egalitarianism conceived at 
the global level. According to Miller, ‘if we are thinking about the issue globally, it 
becomes problematic to define equality by applying Dworkin’s favoured rules [of 
liberty/constraint]’ (Miller 1999b, p. 192). But is it true to say that the specification of 
resource egalitarianism ‘becomes problematic’ at the global level? Surely much 
depends on the kind of state one has in mind. If the citizens of a state possess a 
common understanding of the point and purpose of political community and shared 
beliefs about what constraints ought to be placed upon the pursuit of political goals, 
then in that case the problems of defining equality of resources will not be as severe 
as the problems of defining equality of resources at the global level where common 
understanding and shared beliefs tend to be in short supply. In contrast to this, if the 
citizens of a state lack this common understanding and shared beliefs, this is likely to 
present problems similar to those at the international level (Brown 2009, p. 177). 
 Therefore, from the perspective of the issues discussed in this article the main 
difference between the domestic and global levels is not the kinds of adequacy 
constraints that ought to be imposed on a specification of the Principle of Natural 
Resource Equality but the relative difficulty of satisfying those constraints. For 
example, within the context of Dworkin’s original thought experiment it might be 
appropriate to imagine, reflecting the existence of actual democratic institutions at the 
domestic level, that all of the people shipwrecked on the island are given ample 
opportunity in a sort of ‘town meeting’ to voice their concerns about the proposed 
auction at the point when the divider is deciding what to do with the natural resources. 
Suppose that the divider does not make a decision until all the main objections have 
been aired. It just so happens that any traditionalists or religionists who object to the 
auction do not win the debate. But arguably they would have less grounds on which to 
object since they participated in the process of deliberation and opinion formation 
upon which the divider based his or her final decision. It is more difficult to warrant 
building a similar hypothetical town meeting into the Mini-Earth thought experiment 
given the comparative lack of democratic institutions at the global level (i.e., 
institutions which give all human beings a direct or indirect say in key decisions). 
 Of course, for Dworkin, it is precisely because features of true political 
community (i.e., political dominion, democracy, legal integrity, and fraternity), which 
are characteristically found at the domestic level, are absent at the global level that 
talk of global distributive justice is quite so problematic. Nevertheless, in chapter 5 of 
Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Equality I argued that the existence of true political 
community, in Dworkin’s sense, at the global level is not a necessary condition for 
asserting principles of global distributive justice because other things, including but 
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not limited to being subject to a coercive international legal and political order and the 
profound and pervasive impact of international economic practices on people’s access 
to resources can be sufficient conditions (Brown 2009, pp. 123-9).11 
 So I want to stress that remodelling Dworkin’s thought experiment for the global 
sphere is more than just a provocative attempt to see how far Dworkin’s ideas can be 
stretched in spite of Dworkin himself. It carries the promise of a specification of the 
Principle of Natural Resource Equality which, if adequate, could figure in a plausible 
theory of global distributive justice, along with other sorts of principles. But to pick 
up on the previous paragraph, the project of specifying the Principle of Natural 
Resource Equality would be in vain if it were not allied to, amongst other things, an 
account of the preconditions or grounds for posing questions of global justice. 
 Turning to the question of justification, I believe that there are several possible 
ways of justifying the Principle of Natural Resource Equality, some more attractive 
than others. One way is to say that in the absence of any special or antecedent right to 
Earth’s natural resources no individual has a right to possess more than his or her 
equally valuable share (Barry 1982, p. 235).12 For example, it might be argued that 
since no single human being created Earth’s natural resources − or no single human 
being played a significantly different role in this regard than other human beings − no 
single human being may lay claim to an unequally valuable share (Mazor 2010, p. 
385). Or, even more abstractly: given that there are no morally relevant differences 
between human beings vis-à-vis Earth’s natural resources people have equal claims to 
those resources (Miller 2007, pp. 54-56).  
 Alternatively, one might try to derive the Principle of Natural Resource Equality 
from the fundamental principles of luck egalitarianism. One such principle is that 
global justice requires the elimination of brute luck − call this the Principle of A Priori 
Global Luck Egalitarianism. The operative justification is that the distribution of 
natural resources across the globe is exactly the sort of luck which ought to be 
eliminated.13 Another variant attempts to draw out the Principle of Natural Resource 
Equality from the Principle of Institutional Global Luck Egalitarianism, according to 
which the distribution of natural resources across the globe is in a sense arbitrary it is 
neither just nor unjust in itself; but what can render it just or unjust is what institutions 
do with natural resources vis-à-vis whether or not institutions furnish people with 
equality of access to natural resources. If institutions permit or enable some people to 
appropriate or monopolise the benefits of appropriating natural resources whilst 
excluding others from so doing, then this is unjust.14 An alternative (and in my view 
superior) luck egalitarian principle is the Principle of Interpretive Global Luck 
Egalitarianism. It treats the Principle of Natural Resource Equality as enjoined by 
certain interpretive luck egalitarian requirements that have to do with mitigating the 
effect of brute luck and upholding responsibility for choice against a background of 
equality of opportunity, but at the same time it views these requirements as part and 
parcel of constructive interpretations of various sorts of domestic and international 
institutions, rules, and practices governing the distribution of access to natural 
resources, broadly understood.15  
 Yet another approach is to derive the Principle of Natural Resource Equality from 
the Principle of Collective Ownership: that Earth’s natural resources originally belong 
to humankind collectively or jointly. This derivation would depend on strong reasons 
for permitting the conversion of collective or joint ownership rights into a series of 
individual entitlements to private holdings. It is possible that some of these reasons 
could in turn point in the direction of the Principle of Natural Resource Equality as 
the most appropriate way of regulating the overall shape of individual entitlements. 
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Having said that, there may also be compelling reasons to resist this conversion for 
some of Earth’s natural resources. According to Miller, for example, ‘there may be 
good reasons for not distributing these resources to individuals as private holdings − 
they may, for instance, play an essential part in ecological processes that are of 
general benefit, such as the water cycle’ (Miller 1999a, p. 234).  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 I do not claim, however, that this is how Steiner sees it. 
2 How far the resources are located from human settlements and production sites, how 
much taxation must be paid to possess, transport, and use the resources, levels of 
human knowledge, ingenuity, and technology that can be brought to bear on natural 
resources − these and many other facts influence the usefulness of natural resources to 
the pursuit of desired human ends. 
3 Of course, this proposal also attracts the generic objection to Dworkinean insurance 
schemes that they fail to fully compensate the victims of bad brute luck. See Otsuka 
(2002) and Knight (2009), ch. 1. I do not have space to respond to that objection here. 
4 For Risse’s substantive interpretations, see his (2012), pp. 122-3, 381-2n.22. 
5 I do not assume that my own interpretation matches one or more of Risse’s 
interpretations, but I also do not rule out that possibility. 
6 This constraint builds upon Miller’s critique of liberal, free market mechanisms for 
the valuation of bundles of natural resources. See Miller (1999b), pp. 192-3 and 
(2007), pp. 61-62. 
7 In my book I also presented Global Equality of Resources as enjoined by 
interpretive global luck egalitarianism, which itself is designed to offer a constructive 
interpretation of various international institutions, rules and practices. See Brown 
(2009), chs. 6 and 7. In addition to this, I emphasised the fact that this remodelling of 
Dworkin’s original theory was undertaken in spite of Dworkin’s own scepticism 
about the appropriateness of formulating principles of distributive equality at the 
global level. Ibid., ch. 5. For the purposes of the present article, however, my theory 
of Global Equality of Resources need not be conceived in all of the aforesaid ways. 
But where I do rely upon these other aspects I shall make this clear. 
8 It is worth noting that Steiner initially claimed − and then later recanted the claim − 
that the problem of arbitrariness afflicts the Principle of Value Equality when 
interpreted by and through the mechanism of market prices. See Steiner (1981), p. 
563; cf. his (1994), ch. 5, s. (D). His rationale for recanting that claim was essentially 
that on closer inspection there is nothing arbitrary in the sense of morally unjustified 
per se in the fact that market prices are sensitive to the preferences, desires and 
buying decisions that people develop in response to actual or anticipated bundles of 
natural resources. Steiner (1994), pp. 271-2n.11. In his (2011) Steiner explained his 
recantation thusly: ‘In order to keep things simple, we’ll consider a world with only 
two kinds of natural resources: arable fields and coastal beaches, in equal numbers of 
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acres. To this world we bring two successive generations: an earlier one which is 
predominantly industrious (EI), and the later one, their offspring, who are 
predominantly lazy (LL). So it’s reasonable to assume that, before the arrival of LL, 
the value of a field acre was greater than that of a beach acre. Let’s suppose that their 
exchange ratio (market price) was 1f:4b: that is, one field acre exchanged for four 
beach acres. Had LL, with its stronger preference for leisure, arrived earlier than EI, 
the market price that would have been formed by exchanges among its members is, 
say, 3f:4b. But since LL did not arrive earlier than EI, its members’ initial natural 
resource shares are calculated on the basis of the prevailing (EI-formed) 1f:4b price. 
What this means is that their equal shares each contain more beach acres and less field 
acres than if they had been calculated on the basis of the 3f:4b price. That is, LL 
members’ equal shares contain more of what they value more and less of what they 
value less. Hence it’s difficult to see how the use of EI prices − market prices − 
adversely affects later arrivals’ initial shares and is consequently tainted by partiality.’ 
Steiner (2011), pp. 121-2. 
9 One possibility is to pull apart and separately auction each of the various claims, 
powers, immunities and liberties that bear on the disposition of particular natural 
resources. However, Dworkin rejects that proposal on the grounds that ‘no one can 
intelligently, or even intelligibly, decide what to bid for in an action, or what price to 
bid for it, unless he makes assumptions about how he will be able to use what he 
acquires.’ Dworkin (1987), p. 20. 
10 This example is inspired by Michael Walzer’s discussion of the Kula ring practice 
of the Trobriand Islanders in his (1983), pp. 123-5. Note, however, I would rule out a 
potential solution to this problem in which the auctioneer simply gives the Mini-Earth 
clamshells to the traditionalists once the auction is completed, so that they can use 
these clamshells for their practices of gift-giving and funeral rites. It is unlikely that 
the divider could both let the traditionalists have all the clamshells and satisfy the 
envy test. If the clamshells are, in effect, added to the traditionalists’ bundles of 
natural resources after the auction, then some non-traditionalists may have cause to 
envy the traditionalists’ bundles, especially if they can think of some practical uses to 
which the clamshells might be put, like digging sand, carving wood, holding food, 
and so on. Consequently, we might simply assume for the sake of argument that 
everything goes into the auction and the auctioneer and bidders simply keep in mind a 
running total of how many virtual bidding counters everybody has. 
11 For other pluralistic approaches to the grounds of global distributive justice, see 
Risse (2012), ch. 1 and Wolff (2009). Note, however, that Risse finds the Principle of 
Natural Resource Equality problematic regardless of adopting a pluralistic approach 
to the grounds of justice, and Wolff does not discuss the principle. 
12 Interestingly, this kind of justification has also been used to support the Principle of 
Equal Value. See Steiner (1994), ch. 8 and (1999), pp. 174-5. And to support the 
Principle of Collective Ownership: that Earth’s natural resources originally belong to 
humankind collectively. See Blake and Risse (2009), p. 134. 
13 For a range of different criticisms of this argument, see Schemmel (2007) and 
Brown (2009), pp. 151-3. 
14 Some versions of this approach point to domestic institutions as the source of the 
injustice. See Fabre (2007), p. 149. Other versions instead point to international 
institutions. See Tan (2012), p. 153. For an account of some potential weaknesses in 
institutional approaches, see Brown (2009), pp. 154-6. 
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15 For a full statement of this view and comparisons and contrasts with a priori global 
luck egalitarianism and institutional global luck egalitarianism, see Brown (2009), pp. 
151-6, 184-6, 198-203. 
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